The PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group cordially invites you to its online forum, where we will analyze the recent local electoral outcomes in Turkey.
The event will take place on April 16, 16:00-17:00 British Summer Time on Zoom.
We will be hosting Professor Seda Demiralp from Işık University and Dr Aykut Öztürk from the University of Glasgow, who will share their insights on the notable victories secured by the main opposition party in key cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, indicating a setback for the ruling AKP government. The presentations will be followed by a Q and A session.
Please find the joining link below.
Topic: Turkish Politics Specialist Group Local Election Forum Time: Apr 16, 2024 04:00 PM London
PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group cordially invites you to a virtual book launch event featuring Dr Zeki Sarigil as he introduces his latest work, “How Informal Institutions Matter: Evidence from Turkish Social and Political Spheres.”
Date: March 12, 2024 Time: 13:30 (GMT) Platform: Zoom
The book will be examined by Dr. Digdem Soyaltin Colella from the University of Aberdeen and Şebnem Yardimci-Geyikçi from Universität Bonn. Following the presentation, there will be insightful feedback from the discussants and an engaging Q&A session.
The book is open access and can be read through this link.
Registration can be made through Eventbrite. We look forward to your participation in this enriching discussion.
We are happy to announce the call for submissions for the Summer 2024 Research Colloquium organized by the Turkish Politics Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (PSA). This colloquium aims to bring together postgraduate students, postdoctoral researchers, early-career, and senior academics who study various aspects of Turkish politics.
The colloquium will be conducted virtually in early June 2024 in accordance with Turkish time. It will offer scholars an opportunity to receive feedback on their works in progress and develop their knowledge of different theoretical and methodological approaches to studying Turkish politics.
The colloquium is structured to accommodate four paper presentations. During the initial 20 minutes of the session, each speaker will deliver their working paper. Subsequently, a minimum of one discussant will provide their insights on the draft paper for 20 minutes. To conclude, the final 20 minutes will be dedicated to an extensive Q&A session with the virtual audience.
All participants are required to thoroughly review all papers before the event and be ready to offer constructive feedback in a supportive environment on the respective works. To facilitate this, we kindly request that speakers submit their draft papers at least two weeks ahead of the colloquium. This will grant ample time for both the discussants and the audience to critically assess the drafts.
Applicants should send the abstracts of their draft papers to turkishpoliticspsa@gmail.com (Subject: ResColloq Summer 2024) by March 15th, 2024.
We will notify the successful applicants by March 31st, 2024. We will prepare the line-up once the successful applicants are determined.
We very much look forward to receiving your applications!
Colloquium Organizers
Dr. Buğra Güngör (American University of Central Asia)
Prof. Özlem Kayhan Pusane (Isik University)
Dr. Seçkin Sertdemir-Ozdemir (University of Turku)
PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group is inviting you to its virtual book launch event in which Dr Élise Massicard will present her new book Street-Level Governing Negotiating the State in Urban Turkey, published by Stanford University Press.
The event will take place on Zoom on Wednesday 25 October 2023 at 10:00 (PDT/PST) / 18:00 (BST/CET) / 20:00 (Turkish Time).
The book will be discussed by Professor Yael Navaro (University of Cambridge) and Professor Reşat Kasaba (University of Washington).
The presentations will be followed by feedback from discussants and a Q&A session.
Elise Massicard is Research Professor at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique / Centre for International Studies, Sciences Po. Her research focuses on the political sociology of contemporary Turkey. She studies relationships between space and politics, which she inquires through parties, social movements, the sociology of institutions, state-society relations, and everyday politics.
Massicard is a founding member and a member of the Editorial Board of the European Journal of Turkish Studies. She is also a member of the Editorial board of the journals Critique Internationale, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, and Diyar. Zeitschrift für Osmanistik Türkei- und Nahostforschung (Germany). Elise Massicard is a founding member of the Consortium of European Symposia on Turkey. Since 2017, she is vice chair of the Scientific Interest Group “Middle East and Muslim World”, (GIS MOMM), and she chairs its priority project on structuring French research on Turkish worlds. She is the author of The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (Routledge, 2012) and of Street-level Governing. Negotiating the State in Urban Turkey, (Stanford University Press, 2022). She coedited with Nicole Watts Negotiating political power in Turkey: Breaking up the Party (Routledge, 2013). She coedited with Marc Aymes and Benjamin Gourisse Order and Compromise. Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century (Brill, 2015). She co-edited with Alain Dieckhoff and Christophe Jaffrelot Contemporary Populists in Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
We are happy to announce the call for submissions for the 2023-2024 Research Colloquia organized by the Turkish Politics Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association (PSA). These colloquia aim to bring together postgraduate students, postdoctoral researchers, early-career, and senior academics who study various aspects of Turkish politics.
Photo: Begum Zorlu
The colloquia will be conducted virtually, featuring monthly talks from November 2023 to January 2024 in accordance with Turkish time. It will offer scholars an opportunity to receive feedback on their works-in-progress and develop their knowledge of different theoretical and methodological approaches to studying Turkish politics.
Each colloquium is structured to accommodate two paper presentations. During the initial 20 minutes of the session, each speaker will deliver their working paper. Subsequently, a minimum of one discussant will provide their insights on the draft paper for 20 minutes. To conclude, the final 20 minutes will be dedicated to an extensive Q&A session with the virtual audience.
All participants are required to thoroughly review all papers before the event and be ready to offer constructive feedback in a supportive environment on the respective works. To facilitate this, we kindly request that speakers submit their draft papers at least 10 days ahead of the colloquium. This will grant ample time for both the discussants and the audience to critically assess the drafts.
Applicants should send the abstracts of their draft papers to turkishpoliticspsa@gmail.com (Subject: ResColloq 2023-2024) by September 10th, 2023.
We will notify the first round of successful applicants by September 17th, 2023. We will prepare the line-up once the successful applicants are determined.
We very much look forward to receiving your applications!
Colloquia Organizers Dr. Buğra Güngör (Geneva Graduate Institute) Prof. Özlem Kayhan Pusane (Isik University) Dr. Seçkin Sertdemir-Ozdemir (University of Turku) Dr. Begüm Zorlu (City, University of London)
The PSA’s Annual Conference 2024 will be convened by the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow and held from 25-27 March 2024. It plans to be held only in person. Therefore, we welcome papers and panels which will be presented on-site.
Full conference details can be consulted on the link.
Once again, this year the Turkish Politics Specialist Group will be organizing four panels for the conference. While the theme for the conference is ‘After (Neo-) Liberalism: Towards An Alternative Paradigm’, we are glad to receive quality abstracts on any aspects of Turkish politics, broadly defined.
If you would like to be considered for inclusion in one of these panels, please email us a 200-word abstract by September 5, 2023, to the email address turkishpoliticspsa@gmail.com.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or queries.
PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group hosted a virtual book launch event in which Dr Spyros Sofos presented his book Turkish Politics and ‘The People’ Mass Mobilisation and Populism, published by Edinburgh University Press. The recording of the book launch is available on Youtube.
The book was discussed by Dr Evren Balta (Özyeğin University) and Dr Toygar Sinan Baykan (Kirklareli University). Sofos’s presentation was followed by feedback from discussants and a Q&A session.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Spyros Sofos is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre. He has previously worked as a Research Officer at the LSE Middle East Centre on the Kuwait programme Ecologies of Belonging and Exclusion: An Intersectional Analysis of Urban Citizenship in Kuwait City project. Prior to joining the LSE, he worked as Lecturer and Research Coordinator at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University; Senior Research Fellow at Kingston University; Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Portsmouth and held visiting positions at Siena, Tartu and Istanbul Bilgi Universities.
Turkey’s 2023 elections granted President Erdoğan another victory. Not only did he secure another five-year term as president, but the People’s Alliance he led obtained the majority of parliamentary seats. What are the fundamental dynamics and outcomes of the election process? How did Erdoğan and his coalition manage to claim victory? The view from PSA Turkish Politics for the PSA Blog.
Seda Demiralp (Isik University) argues that the election results were quite disappointing for opposition parties. She proposes that “opposition parties hoped to see that even in hybrid regimes where elections are not entirely free and fair, it is possible to change autocratic incumbents via elections.”
“Also, most observers had thought that Erdoğan had never been this close to losing an election over the past 20 years, mainly because of the major economic crisis Turkey has been going through and the February earthquake that destroyed various cities and took nearly 50,000 lives.”
Demiralp also proposes that many observers wrongly assumed that the structural conditions were so ripe for change that any opposition candidate could win.
She adds: “The opposition’s decision to form an alliance and pursue a campaign that focused on economic problems was promising. This new focus on economic issues contrasted with former campaigns prioritising a return to republican principles (such as secularism) and Western values, which hardly brought new voters in the past. However, the campaign had important shortcomings too.
Too many and diffused promises, lack of coordination among opposition leaders, and perhaps most importantly, opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s lack of charisma to beat Erdoğan were among the main disadvantages of the opposition campaign.
Furthermore, Erdoğan’s campaign appeared relatively weak to many observers, raising hopes for the opposition. The massive economic crisis limited Erdoğan’s ability to focus on daily economic needs, in contrast to his past campaigns. Instead, he pointed at past accomplishments and presented himself not as a mere political figure but as a subject of love. Campaign videos asked voters to choose love (for Erdoğan) over material benefits and emphasised that Erdoğan could still pull the nation out of the economic crisis. Yet, Erdoğan’s killer move came later. In a rally one week before the elections, Erdoğan showed a doctored video demonstrating PKK militants cheering for Kılıçdaroğlu. Erdoğan claimed that Kılıçdaroğlu had allied with the PKK. His new message was that voters faced a choice between national survival and other issues. Kılıçdaroğlu failed to react to these accusations in a timely and effective manner. On May 14, to the surprise of many polling companies, Erdoğan and his People’s Alliance took the first-round lead.”
To end, Demiralp states that “with a desperate effort, Kılıçdaroğlu made a radical turn before the runoff. Not only did he adopt a harsh nationalist discourse, but he also embraced a negative campaign targeting Erdoğan. Yet, with his ill-prepared speeches, awkward masculinity performance and overly eclectic messages that made him look spiritless, he failed to turn the tables and lost in the second round.
Turkey’s 2023 elections failed to provide a model to change autocratic incumbents via elections. Yet, it provided important lessons about limits of economic voting, the role of agency, and the power of emotions over reason.”
Buğra Güngör (Geneva Graduate Institute) proposes that migration has shaped the debate. He argues that: “Even though millions of registered refugees and thousands of irregular migrants constitute one of the most simmering public and political debates, we observed that both incumbent and opposition leaders did not significantly bring them forth before the first round of the presidential elections.
However, as Dr Sinan Ogan, an opposition candidate who the right-wing and nationalist Ata Alliance nominated, has received more than five per cent of the votes that Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu could not secure the majority in the first round, Kilicdaroglu and other leaders of the Nation Alliance drastically switched to an anti-irregular migrant/refugee rhetoric to garner the support of the nationalist electorate – especially in Central Anatolia and Black Sea.”
“Although this strategy did not help Kilicdaroglu to win, it is highly likely that policies and rhetoric concerning the repatriation of irregular migrants and refugees will come back before the March 2024 municipal elections.”
“The existing level of political polarisation in the country would extensively shape the discourse surrounding the millions of refugees and thousands of irregular migrants. Therefore, certain parties would further use the migration issue in Turkey, making a better electoral performance.””
Begum Zorlu (City, University of London) argues that the international dynamics that shaped the electoral process deserve more attention. She states that: “especially how populism transcends borders and foreign policy becomes an arena where the incumbent claims competence has been vital in this electoral cycle.”
She underlines that primarily “the AKP’s populism at home is shaped by its global contestatory frames contributing to a boundary between us and them. Since the Gezi Protests of 2013, but especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the construction of the other has been vital in justifying securitisation, as the AKP elites link the political opposition with foreign threats through a populist framing.”
She adds: “Furthermore, the AKP elites repeatedly underlined how they had transformed Turkey into a global player and praised that they could negotiate with both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war.
While Erdoğan dominates the AKP’s foreign policy outlook, the opposition was more fragmented in raising a strong voice on where they stand on foreign policy.
This contributed to the incumbent framing itself as the solo agent that can maintain Turkey’s national interest.
It is official: Turkey’s presidential election will go to a second round. The two candidates, Erdoğan and Kılıçadaroğlu, differ immensely in their domestic politics. What about their foreign policy outlook? Will the opposition candidate promise to break away from Turkey’s assertive foreign policy? How do international dynamics shape this contentious electoral process?
Our co-convenor Begum Zorlu (City, University of London) has written on the role of foreign policy in Turkish elections for the PSA Blog.
When approached with the question: “what’s foreign policy got to do with the Turkish election” one feels the urge to respond: everything. After 20 years in power, and with international spotlight events like the challenging of the Israeli president Shimon Peres at Davos or comparing German officials to Nazis, Erdoğan and his party dominates the conversation on foreign policy.
Contestatory moves like these are more important than they seem. These statements are the backbone of the incumbent’s populist foreign policy, where the party contests what it labels the “unjust” and “broken” international order, embodied in Erdoğan’s famous slogan “the world is bigger than five”.
The expansion of an injustice frame and how it resonates in the world should not be underestimated.
Followers of Erdoğan around the world voice this vision and have repeatedly underlined that he represents the interests of Muslims around the globe or supports “the voices of the repressed”. This contributes to promoting the incumbent’s framing that without Erdoğan, Turkey’s leadership in contesting injustices domestically and globally will be halted.
The AKP and the International
Under Erdoğan, Turkey has increasingly followed a confrontational foreign policy. However, this has not always been the case. Throughout its first term, along with its acceptance of EU conditionality as part of its desire for EU accession, the AKP used its foreign policy to advance its domestic power. In particular, the AKP came to present itself as a model democratic and Islamic state in the early 2000s. As Cihan Tuğal’s work uncovered, the US was instrumental in promoting what has been termed the “Turkish model”, which resonated with the democracy promotion agenda of the US.
This context changed in the 2010s with the AKP aiming to have an increased influence in the Middle East in the context of Arab Uprisings and increasing authoritarianism at home. After the Gezi Protests of 2013, the AKP adopted a “fifth column[1] frame” to delegitimise the opposition, accusing them of conspiring with international actors. With the 2016 coup attempt, increasing repression had domestic and international consequences. The AKP’s foreign policy took a more interventionist turn, as it directly interfered in multiple conflicts, and ultra-nationalist voices intensified in foreign policy. Turkey’s military intervention in Syria hampered relations with its Western allies and justified the repression of critical voices at home. This is how we came to 2023, with increased domestic and international polarisation. The blocking of Sweden’s NATO membership for example clearly demonstrates the intersection of the domestic and the global. The AKP accused Sweden of harbouring terrorist organisations, highlighting the distinction between friends and foes on both political dimensions.
However, interventionism is not the sole component of the AKP’s foreign policy, and the party argues it follows a competent foreign policy. In their election campaign, the AKP praised that they could negotiate with both sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, make concrete progress such as the grain corridor and prisoner exchange, and keep the possibility of peace on the table. They frame themselves as peacemakers and have used this mediation role to enhance their legitimacy domestically and internationally.
What about the Opposition and Kılıçdaorğlu ?
On the other hand, the political parties that make up the Nation Alliance and Kılıçdaorğlu have been weaker in voicing foreign policy and focused more on domestic issues like Turkey’s economic collapse, democratic backsliding, and justice. When one looks at the electoral manifestos, while foreign policy makes up a small portion of the opposition coalition, it is one of the highlights of the incumbent’s document.
The opposition coalition and their presidential candidate promise a change in foreign policy. Contrasting themselves to the government’s policies, the opposition block’s manifesto claims that they would change Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region and would not interfere in their internal affairs by “taking sides.” The presidential candidate Kılıçdaorğlu, on the other hand, bridges his domestic call for restoring democracy with his foreign policy outlook. The opposition coalition’s manifesto underlines the dangers of personalisation in foreign policy, and Kılıçdaorğlu states that he wants to follow the democratisation processes promoted by the EU.
What about the stance on Russia ?A couple of days before the elections, Kılıçdaorğlu stated in an interview that if he won, he would bring Turkey closer to NATO and the EU and would be willing to impose sanctions on Russia. He has also accused Russia of releasing fake content on social media and criticised the government for maintaining energy dependency on Russia. This has become an area of contestation between the candidates; as a response, Erdoğan stated that Russia is one of Turkey’s most important allies.
Sevgili Rus Dostlarımız, Dün bu ülkede ortaya saçılan montajlar, kumpaslar, Deep Fake içerikler, kasetlerin arkasında siz varsınız. Eğer 15 Mayıs sonrası dostluğumuzun devamını istiyorsanız, elinizi Türk’ün devletinden çekin. Biz hala işbirlikten ve dostluktan yanayız.
— Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (@kilicdarogluk) May 11, 2023
While the opposition has a a pro-Western stance, there is also the framing of dignity from the block in their relations with the West. Their manifesto underlines that there should be a “relationship based on equality” with the US. Similarly, in relations with the EU, the opposition block calls for joint responsibility and burden sharing between Turkey and the EU on refugees and notes its intention to review the Turkey-EU migration deal. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the coalition’s election manifesto has combined migration policies with foreign policy.
From what can be interpreted at the moment, one of the reasons why the six-party opposition coalition is not bold on foreign policy is that this serves as a strategy to hold the group together. The block consists of different voices, from more nationalist to centre-right parties. While Erdoğan dominates the AKP’s foreign policy outlook, the opposition is more fragmented. Also, even though the pro-Kurdish HDP party was not part of the coalition, the cities where Kılıçdaorğlu’s votes were the highest were Kurdish-majority provinces. As the first round of voting demonstrated, without the Kurds’ support, Kılıçdaorğlu cannot be elected.
The nationalist voices in foreign policy are likely to increase whoever gets elected, as the far-right candidate, Sinan Ogan, has received around five per cent of the votes and is critical in determining Turkey’s new president. He recently spoke to Reuters in an interview stating that he would only endorse Kılıçdaorğlu in the runoff if “he ruled out any concessions to the pro-Kurdish party”. Ogan defines himself as the representative of Turkish nationalists and is a staunch supporter of cross-border military operations. He also voices an anti-migrant agenda, arguing that “they will send Syrian refugees by force if necessary”. Therefore the upcoming debates will reflect the anti-migrant and nationalist framing advocated by Ogan and the far-right.
Conclusion
International policy circles are debating the possible scenarios with the two prospective candidates, evaluating whether there will be a break with Turkey’s assertive foreign policy if Kılıçdaorğlu gets elected. The answer is not straightforward, and the international dimension of the election deserves more attention. The AKP’s populism at home is shaped by its global contestatory frames contributing to a boundary between us and them. Especially the construction of the other has been vital in justifying securitisation, as the AKP elites link the political opposition, especially the Kurdish opposition, with foreign threats through a populist framing.
The elections were not free and fair, and as revelations of voting irregularities come in, there are contentious days ahead. If Kılıçdaorğlu gets elected, he promises to decrease the impact of foreign policy on domestic politics and strengthen diplomatic institutions. As stated, Kılıçdaorğlu associates democratisation with enhanced partnership with Western actors, yet the opposition block does not promote a solid and uniform voice on their interpretation of the international order. While the coalition aims to restructure foreign policy and promote a more “rational” foreign policy, the AKP uses the sphere of foreign policy to bolden its injustice frame at home and around the globe. If Erdoğan stays in power, Turkey’s populist and assertive foreign policy will likely continue.
[1] A fifth column is defined as a group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal.
PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group is inviting you to its virtual book launch event in which Dr Dimitar Bechev will present his new book“Turkey Under Erdogan How a Country Turned from Democracy and the West” published by Yale University Press.
The event will take place on Zoom on Thursday, 12 January 2023, 15:00 – 16:00 GMT.
The book will be discussed by Lauren McLaren, Professor of Politics at the University of Leicester and Dr Marc Sinan Winrow (LSE).
The presentations will be followed by feedback from discussants and a Q&A session.
Registration for the event can be made on Eventbrite.
About the speaker
Dr Dimitar Bechev is a lecturer at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies (OSGA), University of Oxford.
He specialises in the international politics of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
Bechev is the author of Turkey under Erdogan (Yale University Press, 2022), Historical Dictionary of North Macedonia (Rowman, 2019), and Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe (Yale UP, 2017) as well as co-editor of Russia Rising: Putin’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa (Bloomsbury, 2021).
To access more information about Turkey Under Erdogan How a Country Turned from Democracy and the West” click here.
PSA Turkish Politics Specialist Group 